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Abstract 
 
Traditionally, Sweden is viewed as a country where corruption and abuse of power for 
personal gains have been regarded as rare exceptions. Accordingly, Sweden is consistently 
found at the top in various international indices of corruption. In recent years, however, 
several instances of corruption and power abuse have been exposed in the media, and surveys 
have shown that large shares of Swedish citizens harbour perceptions that corruption is not 
uncommon among politicians and public officials. Drawing on recent survey data, two 
empirical questions are being investigated. First, to what extent do Swedish citizens believe 
that corruption constitutes a serious problem? Secondly, how do citizens’ evaluations of the 
extent of public corruption affect support for the performance of the democratic system? 
Approaching the issue from a comparative Nordic perspective, data indicates that Swedish 
citizens are considerably more prone to believe that politicians and public officials are corrupt 
and act non-impartially than their Nordic counterparts. The analysis also suggests that such 
perceptions constitute an important determinant of public support for the performance of the 
political system. Thus, even in a least likely case of corruption, such as Sweden, growing 
public concerns about the extent of corruption has a potential to negatively affect the 
legitimacy of the democratic system. 
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Introduction 
 
Corruption distorts free market competition, reduces the readiness of companies to invest, and 
inhibits entrepreneurship. Additionally, corruption threatens the legitimacy of the rule of law 
and lowers public confidence in political institutions. It therefore undermines important 
prerequisites for both economic growth and democratic governance (cf. Bowler & Karp 2004; 
Jain 2001; Rose-Ackerman 1999; Goudie & Stasavage 1998; della Porta & Vanucci 1997). 
All in all, for states, widespread corruption is bad for business. 
 
Sweden, we argue, is a good place to scrutinize closer if one wants to learn more about the 
effects of corruption. This is so precisely because corruption and abuse of power has 
traditionally been perceived as rare exceptions from the rule in Sweden. In international 
rankings, such as Transparency International’s (TI) Corruption Perceptions Index, or the 
World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators, Sweden has consistently received top 
rankings. For example, since TI launched their corruption index in 1995, Sweden has never 
been ranked lower than the sixth least corrupt state in the world. In 2010, Sweden shared the 
fourth place with Finland with a score of 9.2. Only Denmark, New Zealand and Singapore 
were ahead with 9.3.  
 
Moreover, in the latest Rule of Law Index presented by the World Justice Project, Sweden 
was ranked number one (Agrast et al 2010). The high rankings in international comparative 
indices, and a general international image portraying Sweden as a ‘clean’ country, 
corresponds neatly with the general Swedish self-image, i.e. that Sweden is a country ruled by 
law and where corruption and abuse of power are hardly never takes place. Hence, Sweden 
can very well be labelled a ‘least likely case’ concerning the occurrence corruption and low 
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quality of rule of law. One could therefore argue that results on the effects of corruption found 
in this context most probably are magnified in other settings.  
 
Sweden’s low levels of corruption are, of course, good news. Politically, corruption is 
challenging fundamental democratic principles, since it erodes the link between citizens and 
government. As Sandholtz and Koetzle (2000) argue, corruption takes place behind closed 
doors and provides privileged access for some actors, whilst therefore excluding others. 
Corruption violates democratic norms of transparency, equality and fairness. In essence, it 
contravenes the basic principle of impartiality, i.e. that public institutions should operate in an 
impartial, rule-based manner, a principle which has been emphasized as the defining feature 
of high quality government (Rothstein and Teorell 2008). If citizens perceive their political 
representatives and civil servants as being devoted to their own enrichment, rather than to the 
public interest, trust and support for the democratic political system and its institutions could 
well be eroded (Sandholtz & Taagepera 2005, 109; cf. Norris 1999).  
 
Related to this, it is important to note that although Sweden is recognised as one of the least 
corrupt countries in the world does, this does not imply that corruption and power of abuse 
are wholly absent (cf. Andersson et al 2010). In fact, throughout the last two decades several 
corruption scandals have been exposed at all levels in government. Sweden has also recently 
been internationally criticised for the way it deals with its problems of corruption. For 
example, the European Council has expressed harsh critique against Sweden for lacking a 
formal regulation on political party financing (Sandgren 2009), and already in the early 
2000s, Sweden was criticised by GRECO (Group of States Against Corruption, 2001) for 
lacking sufficient means to detect and prevent corruption. Additionally, recent  surveys have 
showed that, for example, one out of six top officials in Swedish municipalities have 
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experienced bribe-attempts (Dagens Samhälle 2010), and one out of three Swedish 
municipalities have experienced cases of corruption in 2010 (Sveriges Radio 2010).1 As 
Erlingsson et al (2009) argue, it may well be the case that corruption and power abuse has 
become an increasing problem throughout the past three decades. 
 
Thus, although Sweden historically has been regarded as one of the world’s leading states in 
controlling corruption, recent developments suggest that also ‘least likely cases for 
corruption’ are not immune from problems concerning corruption and power of abuse. It is 
important, we maintain, not to regard the exposed corruption cases as rare exceptions to the 
rule. On the contrary, one must acknowledge corruption as a real existing problem in Sweden 
that may well, in the long run, generate several of the unwanted effects.  
 
In this paper, we focus on one of the negative effects that is often highlighted in comparative 
research on corruption, but seldom empirically investigated, and certainly not in advanced 
democracies such as Sweden: To what extent does corruption affect public support for the 
democratic system? Drawing on recent survey data, we set out to answer two empirical 
questions. The first deals with the way Swedish citizens view domestic corruption problems: 
To what extent do the citizens believe that corruption is a serious problem in Sweden? The 
second question deals with the effect of citizens’ perceptions of corruption on system support: 
Are citizens’ evaluations of the extent of public corruption an important determinant of 
support for the performance of the democratic system? From the results of a few earlier 
studies we know that the occurrence, and perceptions, of corruption affect public support for 
the political system (Anderson & Tverdova 2003), particularly in countries where corruption 
                                                 
1 This new found interest in corruption and power abuse from Swedish media in 2010 was sparked by the 
exposure of a large scale corruption scandal in Sweden’s second largest city, Gothenburg, where several top 
officials had tight connections with a construction company, and allegedly, had let themselves been bribed to 
treat the company favourably in the municipality’s purchasing processes. 
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is more widespread and where levels of political support are lower, e.g. in Latin America (cf. 
Seligson 2002; Booth & Seligson 2009) and Central and Eastern Europe (cf. Linde 2009; 
Rose et al 1998). Thus, by studying the effect of perceived corruption on system support in a 
‘least likely’ case as Sweden, the results will contribute to our general understanding of the 
determinants of system support also in mature welfare states and advanced, ‘non-corrupt’ 
democracies.      
 
The article proceeds as follows. In the first section, the central concepts of the analysis are 
defined, discussed and operationalised. In the second, a descriptive analysis of public 
perceptions of corruption and institutional fairness, drawing on recent survey data, is carried 
out. The third part attempts to show that perceptions of institutional fairness and public 
corruption is an important determinant of public support that has been underestimated in 
earlier research on system support in advanced democracies, such as Sweden. In the fourth 
part, we present the conclusions and the implications of our analysis. 
  
Theory: Corruption, impartiality and political support 
 
The last decades has seen a steady increase in empirical studies of the causes and effects of 
what has been labelled ‘quality of government’ (cf. Rothstein & Teorell 2008; Rothstein 
2009; 2003; Charron & Lapuente 2010; Adserá et al 2003; La Porta et al. 1999; Geissel 
2008). Although not a coherent body of research, most studies have one thing in common: 
they regard corruption as one of the most, if not the most, serious challenges to governance of 
high quality. Besides having damaging economic effects, corruption contravenes what has 
been put forth to be the basic principle of quality of government, namely impartiality in the 
exercise of public power. According to Rothstein and Teorell (2008, 170; Rothstein 2009) this 
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means that ‘when implementing laws and policies, government officials shall not take 
anything about the citizen/case into consideration that is not beforehand stipulated in the 
policy or the law’. Thus, impartiality in the exercise of public power rules out all forms of 
corruption and ‘particularistic’ practices such as clientelism, patronage and discrimination 
(Rothstein & Teorell 2008, 171; cf. Kurer 2005).  
 
The focus on impartial implementation of political policy means that citizens’ perceptions of 
the impartiality of public institutions and actors that implement public policy will be our main 
concern here. Our argument is that citizens’ evaluations of the impartiality of institutions and 
public officials exercise a significant impact on evaluations of the performance of the political 
system as a whole (cf. Norris 1999; Linde & Ekman 2003; Dalton 2004; Anderson et al. 
2005; Easton 1965; 1975). Our theoretical and empirical claim is thus closely related to the 
‘procedural fairness’ argument, stating that it is the fairness of the procedures through which 
institutions and authorities exercise authority which is the key to the willingness of 
individuals to defer to the decisions and rules created and implemented by those authorities 
and institutions.2 Thus, we assume that evaluations of the fairness of decisions and 
implementation of policy are independent of one’s self-interest (Kumlin 2004, 42; 2007, 373; 
Tyler 2006). There are a number of important reasons why people care about the way 
decisions are made and in what way they are implemented. For example, that most people 
consider fair treatment a moral right, that procedural fairness provides reasons to trust 
decision-makers and civil servants, that fair procedures indicate that one is respected by the 
party making the decision, and that procedural judgements provide individuals with a mean to 
evaluate outcomes when the fairness of outcomes in themselves is uncertain (Esaiasson 
2010). Thus, whether citizens regard policies and decisions as legitimate depends on whether 
                                                 
2 For a review of procedural fairness theory, see Tyler (2006) and Esaiasson (2010). 
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they believe them to be fair and impartial and, of course, if they are implemented in a fair and 
impartial manner (Rothstein 2009; Gilley 2009, 72; Tyler et al. 1989; Tyler 2006; 1994).  
 
Previous research has examined a large amount of factors that may influence what people 
think about the principles and performance of their political system and its institutions. These 
investigations can be divided into two main approaches (Weatherford 1992, 149). Macro-
studies have emphasised formal system properties, such as the appropriate set-up of 
democratic institutions that would allow for accountability, responsiveness and 
representation, and their importance for system support. Micro-level studies emphasise the 
importance of citizens’ attitudes and actions, such as political interest and trust in political 
institutions. More recently, some analysts have made successful attempts to combine both 
perspectives in cross-national multi-level analyses, taking into account both micro-level 
characteristics and contextual variables on the macro-level (cf. Anderson et al. 2005).  
 
These approaches have generated hypotheses about the impact of a large number of factors 
that may explain public support for the political system. The vast amount of empirical studies 
that have been produced in this field – covering both old and new democracies – cannot be 
described in detail here. However, the various explanatory factors that have been investigated 
can be categorised into a number of broader areas of interest. The research during the last 
decades has highlighted the importance of issues such as different aspects of economic 
performance, both actual and perceived, (cf. Clarke et al. 1993; Finkel et al. 1989; Rose & 
Mishler 1994), political factors, such as perceptions of the regime’s respect for human rights, 
levels of corruption (on the macro-level), being a political winner or loser, type of electoral 
system and political interest (cf. Hofferbert & Klingemann 1999; Evans & Whitefield 1995; 
Anderson & Tverdova 2003; 2001; Anderson & Guillory 1997; Anderson et al. 2005; Blais & 
Gélineau 2007; Wagner et al. 2008; Mattes & Bratton 2007), interpersonal and institutional 
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trust (cf. Putnam 1993; Warren 1999; Kunioka & Woller 1999; Dalton 2004, 69-71), and 
value change (cf. Inglehart 1997; Inglehart & Welzel 2005).  
 
The explanatory factor which is our main concern here has received a surprisingly limited 
interest from political scientists interested in the determinants of political support. However, 
throughout the last decades, a small but growing stock of evidence that supports the ‘fair 
process effect’ has been produced. It has been shown that the legitimacy of political 
authorities and institutions diminishes when they do not adhere to norms of procedural 
fairness. This is true both in established and in new democracies. In the American context, 
Tyler et al. (1989) have demonstrated that diffuse support for the political system is to a large 
extent a product of the citizens’ judgement of procedural fairness. Kumlin has shown that 
individual experiences from interaction with welfare institutions have a substantial effect on 
trust and social capital in Sweden (Kumlin 2004; cf. Kumlin & Rothstein 2005).3 Drawing on 
survey data from the US and Norway, Miller and Listhaug (1999) found that public 
evaluations of the fairness of government processes are an important aspect when it comes to 
judging the trustworthiness of government.  
 
The importance of procedural fairness has also been shown in more recent democracies. In a 
comparative analysis of four Latin American countries, Seligson (2002) concluded that 
procedural injustice and partiality in the form of corruption has a significant negative effect 
on support for the political system in general. In a more recent study of eight Latin American 
countries, Booth and Seligson (2009) found that citizens that have been subjected to 
corruption consistently evaluated the performance of their governments and political 
institutions more negatively. However, it is important to note that the two latter studies 
                                                 
3 Also see Esaiasson (2010) in which it is shown that the perceived fairness of treatment has a strong impact on 
citizens’ acceptance of decisions by government officials. In fact perceived fairness is observed to matter much 
more than the actual conduct by the officials. 
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investigated in what way people’s actual experiences of corruption affect support, not 
citizens’ perceptions of the corruptness of public officials. Interestingly, the findings of the 
few micro-level analyses available also seem to travel well to the macro level. In a panel 
analysis of aggregated West European survey data, Wagner et al (2008) show that high-
quality institutions, such as successful control of corruption and rule of law, exercise a strong 
positive effect on aggregate levels of satisfaction with democracy. 
 
Thus, drawing on the results of earlier research on different types of democracies we may 
hypothesise a positive relationship between citizens’ perceptions of the impartiality – 
measured as perceptions of fair and non-corrupt government institutions – and support for the 
performance of the political system in general. In other words, citizens will evaluate the 
political system in positive terms if they believe that the system is impartial in the exercise of 
political power. Since we are interested in explaining support for the political system as a 
function of factors measured at the level of individuals, this study fits in neatly with the 
micro-level approach described above. 
 
Perceptions of impartiality and corruption: Sweden in a 
comparative perspective 
 
 It is important to view Sweden’s top rankings in different corruption indices from a 
comparative perspective. Most countries – in particular developing countries and 
‘transitional’ states – have serious problems with corruption and abuse of power. The fact that 
Swedish authorities are viewed as world leading when it comes to fair and impartial 
institutions is not in any way a guarantee for the absence of corruption. Quite the opposite, 
some analysts have recently pointed out that corruption and abuse of power is becoming an 
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increasing problem in Sweden (Erlingsson et al 2008; Erlingsson 2010). From our perspective 
this is bad news. The theory described above predicts that corrupt and impartial behaviour on 
behalf of public officials – and even more serious; widespread public perceptions of 
corruptness – should have negative effects on citizens’ evaluations of the performance of the 
political system.  
 
To investigate this hypothesised relationship we start out by inquiring how Swedish citizens 
perceive the extent of corruption and impartial behaviour among politicians, public officials 
and institutions. Here we will place Sweden in a comparative Nordic perspective, presenting 
survey data on perceptions of institutional fairness and extent of corruption also from 
Denmark, Finland and Norway. Like Sweden, these countries have earned an international 
reputation as being in the top when it comes to belonging to the world’s least corrupt 
countries. In the 2010 Corruption Perceptions Index, Denmark comes out as most successful 
in the world at combating corruption with a score of 9.3 (together with New Zealand and 
Singapore). Finland and Sweden share the fourth place with a score of 9.2. Norway is rated 
somewhat lower, receiving the tenth place with 8.6.  
 
A central argument in the procedural fairness theory is that people are concerned with aspects 
of their experience from contacts with the authorities that are not linked to actual outcomes. 
These aspects include impartiality, lack of bias, honesty, politeness and respect for citizens’ 
rights (Tyler 2006, 7). Thus, individuals that feel that they have been treated equally and fair 
by the authorities, also tend to be more prone to view decisions and outcomes as legitimate. In 
order to investigate public perceptions of procedural fairness, we will utilise survey data 
tapping ordinary citizens’ views of the impartiality and fairness of public officials. Table 1 
presents responses to a question about to what extent the respondents believe that public 
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officials are treating people fairly. The data reveal a substantial degree of distrust in the 
fairness of public officials in the Nordic countries covered in the International Social Survey 
Programme’s (ISSP) survey ‘Role of Government IV’.  
 
Table 1. Fair treatment from public officials, 2006 (Per cent)  
 Almost always Often Occasionally Seldom Almost never 
Sweden 24.9 35.5 26.1 9.9 3.6 
Denmark 44.9 36.5 12.9 3.6 2.1 
Finland 32.0 40.5 18.1 7.0 2.5 
Norway 25.5 40.7 23.0 7.7 3.2 
Mean 31.8 38.3 20.0 7.0 2.85 
Source: International Social Survey Programme (2006). 
Note: Question reads: ‘In your opinion, how often does public officials deal fairly with people like 
you?’ ‘Can’t choose’ and ‘No answer’ have been left out. 
 
In Sweden, ranked as number one in World Justice Projects’ rule of law index, no less that 
13.5 per cent of the respondents state that public officials only ‘seldom’ or ‘almost never’ 
treat people fairly. Only a fourth believe that people ‘almost always’ are being treated in an 
even-handedly manner. There are no dramatic differences between the Nordic countries, 
although the Danes stand out substantially more satisfied with the fairness of public officials, 
while Sweden show the highest levels of discontent. The Swedish citizens are also those 
clearly most prone to think that the treatment people get from public officials depends on 
contacts (Table 2).  
 
Table 2. Treatment by officials depends on contacts, 2006 (Per cent) 
 Definitely Probably Probably not Definitely not 
Sweden (n=1133) 41.0 48.5 9.0 1.6 
Denmark (n=1287) 8.4 32.3 24.8 16.5 
Finland (n=1075) 13.4 43.5 36.1 7.0 
Norway (n=1234) 21.4 46.7 28.0 3.9 
Mean 20.7 42.5 29.3 7.5 
Source: International Social Survey Programme (2006). 
Note: Question reads: ‘Do you think that the treatment people get from public officials in [Country] 
depends on who they know?’ ‘Can’t choose’ and ‘No answer’ have been left out. 
 
As is evident, a stunning 41 per cent of the Swedish respondents believe that individual 
citizens ‘definitely’ could take advantage of personal contacts in their dealings with public 
officials. Another 48 per- cent believe that this is ‘probably’ the case. In the other Nordic 
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countries the corresponding levels are much lower, with the Danish respondents expressing 
the highest levels of trust in the impartiality of public officials. Thus far, it seems evident that 
there is a widespread feeling among Swedish citizens that many public officials disrespect the 
principle of impartiality in their implementation of public policy. This is particularly 
interesting considering Sweden’s international reputation as a country where the rule of law 
reigns, and problems of corruption and partial exercise of power are among the lowest in the 
world.  
 
We now turn to a number of questions more specifically concerned with corruption among 
public officials and politicians, both on the national level and in Swedish municipalities. The 
first question concerns corrupt behaviour among public officials. The result is presented in 
Table 3. Once again, the Swedish respondents report the highest levels of distrust. About a 
fourth of the Swedes regard ‘almost all’ or ‘quite a lot’ of the public officials as being 
involved in corrupt activities of some kind. Not even one out of ten Swedes believes that 
corruption among government institutions is an extraordinary action to such extent that 
‘almost none’ are taking part in it.  
 
Table 3. Public officials involved in corruption, 2006 (Per cent) 
 Almost none A few Some Quite a lot Almost all 
Sweden (n=936) 8.2 30.6 36.6 21.8 2.8 
Denmark (n=1133) 31.1 53.5 12.4 2.2 0.8 
Finland (n=970) 13.5 36.1 33.2 14.6 2.6 
Norway (n=1164) 8.2 29.9 42.7 18.7 0.4 
Mean 15.6 37.8 31.0 14.0 1.5 
Source: International Social Survey Programme (2006). 
Note: Question reads: ‘In your opinion, about how many public officials in [Country] are involved in 
corruption?’ ‘Can’t choose’ and ‘No answer’ have been left out. 
 
The same pattern is found when citizens are asked about the extent of corruption among 
politicians (Table 4). Almost 22 per cent of the Swedish respondents report that ‘quite a lot’ 
or ‘almost all’ politicians are corrupt to some extent. The corresponding figures in the other 
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countries are substantially lower, with Denmark at the other end of the spectrum (3.4 per 
cent). 
 
Table 4. Politicians involved in corruption, 2006 (Per cent) 
 Almost none A few Some Quite a lot Almost all 
Sweden (n=929) 11.3 32.5 34.3 17.1 4.7 
Denmark (n=1170) 40.0 46.8 9.7 2.2 1.2 
Finland (n=957) 17.0 37.1 29.8 13.8 2.3 
Norway (n=1138) 22.4 32.3 34.4 10.3 0,6 
Mean 23.6 37.5 26.4 10.3 2.1 
Source: International Social Survey Programme (2006). 
Note: Question reads: ‘In your opinion, about how many politicians in [Country] are involved in 
corruption?’ ‘Can’t choose’ and ‘No answer’ have been left out. 
 
When it comes to perceptions of absence of corruption, there is a considerable variation 
among the four countries. In Denmark, the share of respondents thinking that ‘almost no’ 
politicians are behaving corrupt is 40 per cent. In Sweden this proportion is only 11 per cent, 
while the corresponding figures for Finland and Norway are 17 and 22 per cent. All in all, this 
short presentation of available comparative data testifies to a consistent pattern. Swedish 
citizens are considerably more negative in their evaluations of the way public officials and 
politicians stick to the principles of fairness and impartiality in political decisions and the 
implementation of public policy than their Nordic counterparts.  
 
From our perspective, seeing procedural fairness as a potentially important determinant of 
political support, the first question that comes to mind is if the negative evaluations of the 
Swedish citizens compared to the publics in the other countries are transferred to the level of 
more general political support. Unfortunately, the ISSP 2006 survey does not carry any 
questions about support for the political system and its institutions, making it impossible to 
examine the relationship between perceptions of impartial treatment and system support. The 
item that comes closest to a proxy for some kind of generalised political support is a question 
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about whether or not the respondents trust civil servants to do what is best for the country.4 Of 
course, this question is closely related to the items asking about the fairness and corruption of 
public officials and not surprisingly, the micro-level correlations between the ‘public 
officials-variables’ and trust in civil servants are strong.5 Somewhat more interestingly is the 
fact that citizens’ perceptions of the extent of corrupt behaviour among politicians also are 
strongly correlated with citizens’ general trust in civil servants (Pearson’s r ranging from .28 
in Denmark to .45 in Finland). On the aggregate level the relationship is relatively strong. In 
Denmark, where citizens are most likely to believe that politicians and public officials are 
‘clean, 56 per cent of the respondents also express trust in civil servants. The corresponding 
figure for Sweden is as low as 17 per cent. Finland and Norway come in between with 45 and 
35 per cent respectively. However, since our main interest is on the relationship between 
perceptions of procedural fairness and a more general support for the political system we need 
solid operational indicators of both perceptions of impartiality and political support.  
 
The effect of perceptions of corruption on political support 
 
In order to carry out a thorough and careful investigation of the relationship between 
perceptions of procedural fairness and political support, we turn to a new survey of political 
attitudes among Swedish citizens. 
Data and measurement 
Our analysis draws on data from Survey 2009, which was carried out by the Survey Institute at 
the Linnaeus University during the spring of 2009. It covers a representative sample of 
                                                 
4 The respondents had the possibility to ‘strongly agree’, ‘agree’, ‘neither agree nor disagree’, ‘disagree’ or 
‘strongly disagree’ with the statement ‘Most civil servants can be trusted to do what is best for the country’. 
5 The correlations between the ‘public officials involved in corruption’ item and trust in civil servants are .33 for 
Denmark, .46 for Finland, .30 for Norway and .36 in Sweden (all correlation significant at the 0.01 level). 
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Swedish residents between 15 and 85 years of age and contains a number of questions about 
politics and trust that are relevant to our interests.6 Survey 2009 does not contain explicit 
questions about procedural fairness, but nonetheless a few questions about the extent of 
corruption on the municipal level. In the analysis we will use two of these items as our 
measures of public perceptions of the fairness and impartiality of politicians and public 
officials. The first item deals with corruption and abuse of power among politicians and 
public officials and the respondents have the possibility to agree or disagree to the following 
statement: ‘It is common that local level politicians and public officials take advantage of, and 
abuse, their position for their own good’. The second question reads: ‘How do you think that 
the problems with abuse of power among politicians and public officials have changed during 
the last fifteen years?’. The respondents have the option to choose from a five-point scale 
going from ‘increased a lot’ to ‘decreased a lot’.  
 
In order to investigate the effect of perceptions of corruption on system support we also need 
an indicator that taps generalised support for the performance of the political system. Survey 
2009 provides a version of the frequently used question about ‘satisfaction with democracy’, 
however somewhat differently phrased: ‘If you think about the democratic system in our 
country, how well do you think it works?’ The ‘satisfaction with democracy’ item has been 
debated in the literature on system support, and it has been discussed what it actually 
measures (cf. Canache et al. 2001; Anderson 2002; Booth & Seligson 2009; Anderson & 
Guillory 1997; Anderson & Tverdova 2003; Linde & Ekman 2003). Empirical analyses have 
nevertheless shown that it should be interpreted an indicator of support for the perceived 
performance of the political system (Linde & Ekman 2003; Anderson 2002; cf. Norris 1999). 
                                                 
6 See Hagevi (2010) for more information about Survey 2009. 
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Thus, we will use this item as our dependent variable, i.e. generalised support for the actual 
performance of the Swedish political system (cf. Fuchs et al 1995).  
The effect of perceptions of corruption on support for democracy 
 
The data from the ISSP 2006 testified to widespread public discontent with the way 
politicians and public officials are acting on the national level among. The questions in Survey 
2009 ask specifically about the extent of corruption on the local level. The respondents can 
agree or disagree to the statement that it is common that politicians and public officials take 
advantage of their position. 18.7 per cent ‘definitely agree’, 24.5 per cent agree ‘to a large 
extent’ and 25.3 per cent agree ‘to some extent’. Only 9.7 per cent of the respondents do ‘not 
at all’ agree. Thus, the levels of perceived extent of corruption in Survey 2009 – which will be 
used in the multivariate analyses – correspond almost perfectly with those in ISSP 2006 
reported above in Tables 3 and 4. Survey 2009 also contains a variable that provide strong 
evidence for the fact that Swedish citizens believe that corruption is a problem that has 
increased over the last two decades. 56 per cent of the respondents believe that the problem of 
corruption has increased ‘strongly’ or ‘somewhat’ during the last 15 years, while only 14 per 
cent believe that corruption among politicians and public officials is a diminishing problem in 
Swedish municipalities. These figures fit neatly with other available data. In a survey 
conducted in 2003, 40 per cent of the Swedish citizens stated that they believed corruption to 
increase in the near future. In 2007, the share of pessimistic respondents had grown to 59 per 
cent (Global Corruption Barometer 2003; 2007).  
 
The relationship between perceptions of corruption and system support is tested by a series of 
logistic regression analyses that are presented in Table 5. The dependent variable is a 
dichotomy of the question ‘If you think about the democratic system in our country, how well 
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do you think it works?’ taking on the value 1 if the respondent is ‘very’ or ‘somewhat’ 
satisfied with the way democracy works and the value 0 if the respondent is ‘very’ or 
‘somewhat’ satisfied. As indicated earlier, the performance of the Swedish democratic system 
is in general favourably evaluated by the citizens. 75 per cent of the respondents think that 
democracy works ‘very’ or ‘fairly good’. 
 
The first model in Table 5 examines the effect of citizens’ perceptions of the extent of 
corruption among local levels politicians and public officials on satisfaction with democracy. 
It also includes four standard socio-demographic control variables (gender, age, education and 
income), in order to rule out the possibility that the strong effects of perceived corruption are 
due to the individuals’ social characteristics rather than their perceptions of the extent of 
corruption. As out hypothesis suggests, perceptions of corruption show a statistically 
significant effect on the dependent variable, meaning that citizens who perceive politicians 
and public officials as not being involved in corrupt activities also tend to be content with the 
way the democratic political system works. The regression also shows that educational level 
and personal income have a positive effect on the dependent variable.  
 
In the second model, we investigate how people’s perceptions of the development of 
corruption affect their evaluations of the performance of the democratic system. This item 
asks the question in what way the respondents believe that the problems with abuse of power 
and corruption among local politicians and public officials have developed during the last 15 
years. The analysis shows that also perceptions of the development of corruption have a 
statistically significant effect on political support, although not as strong as the extent of 
corruption.  
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Table 5: Effects of perceived corruption on satisfaction with democracy (logit coefficients and 
standard errors) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Politicians and public officials are engaged 
in corruption 
(1=definitely agree, 4=definitely disagree) 
.584*** 
(.072) 
 .476*** 
(.081) 
Development of corruption last 15 years 
(1=strongly increased, 5=strongly 
decreased) 
 .349*** 
(.063) 
.166** 
(.074) 
Political interest 
(1=not at all interested, 4=very interested) 
  .333*** 
(.088) 
Interpersonal trust 
(1=definitely disagree, 4=definitely agree) 
  .027 
(.082) 
Gender 
(1=female, 2=male) 
-.141 
(.130) 
-.201 
(.123) 
-.245* 
(.136) 
Age 
 
.006* 
(.004) 
.005 
(.003) 
.004 
(.004) 
Education 
(six levels) 
.120*** 
(.038) 
.169*** 
(.036) 
.087** 
(.041) 
Income 
(five levels) 
.141** 
(.056) 
.141*** 
(.053) 
.151*** 
(.058) 
Pseudo R2 .07 .05 .09 
* p<.10 ** p<..05 *** p<.01 
Source: Survey 2009.  
 
The third model in Table 5 tests the independent effects of the corruption variables, and also 
introduces two variables that in earlier studies have shown to be of great importance for 
system support. As expected from the results of earlier research, political interest also shows a 
statistically significant effect on support. However, interpersonal trust is not of any 
importance for generalized system support in Sweden, at least not when controlling for 
perceptions of corruption: the coefficient is very small, and not statistically significant. The 
introduction of the control variables causes only minor changes in the effect of perceived 
extent of corruption. The coefficient is only slightly dwarfed and still statistically significant 
at the 99 per cent level.  
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Whether or not the respondents believe that the problems with corruption have increased 
during the last 15 years seems to matter less when taking their perceptions of the current 
extent of corruption into account, but the effect is nevertheless significant at the 95 per cent 
level. Thus, the empirical analysis provides strong support in favour of the ‘procedural 
fairness claim’ proposed in this paper, i.e. that the perceived level of impartiality in the 
processes of decision making and implementation of policies are the most important source of 
political support. The results from the regression analyses give evidence to a statistically 
significant effect of perceptions of corruption on support for the performance of the Swedish 
democratic system. In order to facilitate the interpretation of the logistic regression analyses, 
the results can be transformed into changes in the predicted probabilities on expressing 
satisfaction with the way democracy works. The predicted probabilities of satisfaction with 
democracy are illustrated in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. Predicted probabilities of satisfaction with democracy at different levels of perceived 
corruption 
 
Note: The predicted probabilities are based on the logistic regression model 3 in Table 5. The effects 
of the independent variable are calculated when all other variables in the model are held at their mean. 
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Figure 1 shows quite substantial differences in predicted probabilities for different 
perceptions of the extent of corruption among local level politicians and public officials. A 
person who strongly disagrees to the proposition that acts of corruption and abuse of power 
are common has a probability of .88 to also express satisfaction with the way the democratic 
system works. The corresponding figure for those who believe that corruption is widespread 
is .64, producing a difference of 24 percentage points between the two extreme positions. 
Thus, although general system support in Sweden is at high levels seen from a comparative 
perspective, it is strongly affected by public perceptions of corruption. Therefore – from a 
democratic perspective – it is troublesome that a large share of the Swedish public believe 
that the extent of corruption has increased during the last decades, and that it is likely that it 
continues to increase in the future. 
 
Conclusions 
Corruption and abuse of power are topics that have typically been discussed in relation to 
developing countries, or in transitional settings, i.e. countries with relatively high levels of 
corruption. Since the mid-1990s, however, increasing attention has been paid to these issues 
even in advanced democracies, and nowadays it is widely acknowledged that even though 
states do get good gradings by Transparency International and other monitoring organisations, 
this does not automatically imply that corruption and abuse of power do not constitute real 
problems and therefore can have detrimental effect even in these settings. This article is about 
corruption in ‘least corrupt settings’, and we have focused on Sweden, a state that has 
consistently been ranked among the six least corrupt countries in the world by TI and was 
recently ranked as number one in World Justice Projects Rule of Law Index.  
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We have approached the issue by highlighting one crucial negative effect of corruption that is 
often discussed in the literature, but is seldom investigated empirically, namely: To what 
extent does corruption affect public support for the democratic system in an advanced 
democracy and least corrupt setting such as Sweden? Our results indicate that Swedish 
citizens to to a large extent do believe that their politicians and public officials are corrupt. In 
addition, 9 out 10 believe that individual citizens ‘definitely’ or ‘probably’ can take advantage 
of personal contacts in their dealings with public officials. This certainly raises questions 
about the universality and impartiality of the public administration in Sweden, particularly 
since corresponding levels are much lower in the other Nordic countries.  
 
But what can these public perceptions really tell us? A skeptic could argue that there is no 
need to be alarmed by these results since the correspondence between citizen perceptions of 
corruption, and the actual occurrence of it, is in no way obvious. As valid as this argument 
may be, we do strongly argue that it does not really matter whether or not citizens’ perception 
of corruption and the actual extent of corruption correspond, at least not from the system 
support perspective we have adopted here. Our results show that even in a ‘least corrupt’ 
setting such as Sweden, citizens’ perceptions of corruption do have an independent effect on 
their support for the political system. Although general system support in Sweden is 
comparatively high, we have showed that it is affected by public perceptions of corruption. 
 
Against this backdrop, it is deeply worrying that large shares of the Swedish citizens do 
believe that the extent of corruption has increased during the last decades, and think that it is 
likely that it will continue to increase in the future. If the share of citizens who believes that 
politicians and public officials are using their positions for their own good is increasing in the 
 21
future, as indicated by our data, in the long run it could have a significant eroding effect on 
general system support in Sweden. 
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